In 1648, an uprising broke out in Ukraine that belonged to Poland at the time. The war was not successful for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Cossacks and Tartars, who were helping them during the war, surrounded Zbaraż, about whose defense everyone knew in the country. King Jan Kazimierz decided to set out to rescue the besieged fortress. It was decided that not only Polish troops, but also soldiers of Lithuania would set out for Ukraine. Not only state armies, but also private regiments set out to fight. The article discusses the problem of the reasons for the participation of Lithuanians in the war, which was not only due to the provisions of the union, but also to be in the king's party. Therefore, only the branches of magnates who belong to the Jan Kazimierz party joined the Polish army. The king's army reached Zborów, where the battle ended with treaties. The Polish nobility was not happy with them, but they caused a temporary suspension of the war. Important will also be the international echoes of the battle of Zborow with the greater strength of the Cossacks and Tartars.
Nowogródek were still within reach of the enemy troops. In addition, the situation was inflamed by local peasant rebellions, and the nobles did not hurry with an armed action or adopted high enough taxes for the war on Lithuanian councils. The military goal of Janusz Radziwiłł, the commander of the Lithuanian army, was primarily to secure the Lithuanian-Ukrainian borderline, from which he made his arrival to the election of a new king9. With the problem of border defense, the forces of the Lithuanian Field Hetman were associated with private and poviat banners. Soon Władysław Chalecki, Jan Pac and Władysław Wołłowicz, as well as the Pińsk county and the Brześć region of Lithuania, joined Janusz Radziwiłł's companion. Grand Pantler of Lithuania Wincenty Gosiewski, Radziwiłł was sent back to Warsaw leaving the banners he brought. The Lithuanian Equerry Bogusław Radziwiłł also operated in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Field Hetman also negotiated with his political opponent, the Lithuanian Deputy Chancellor Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, regarding the taking over of his private troops under his command, which of course did not bring the intended results. Activities of the Lithuanian Field Hetman brought about a temporary improvement in the situation. He wrote to Kazimierz Leo Sapieha that Chmielnicki's army had withdrawn and only a little rebellious peasantry remained10. In reality, however, he suffered from a lack of soldiers; he only had 7 banners, including those at his own expense. These problems were partly the result of the remaining banners commanded by members of Tyzenhauz family, which had a break in warfare. They had not a small number of soldiers -600 reiters, 200 dragoons, and 200 infantry. These units did not join Radziwiłł due to failure to pay debt to them and the lack of money for further service. The small number of troops at the side of the Field Hetman was also caused by a lack of necessary funds in the Lithuanian treasury, which resulted from the failure to pay fiscal receivables by the nobles, who did not want to spend money even with the Hetman confirmation. Some poviats simply refused to issue them, claiming that they used them to enlist poviat banners and defend their castles. In connection with this, Janusz Radziwiłł sent the Vice-Chancellor a list of his allocations containing information on the payments of individual poviats11.
During the interregnum period the attacks of the Cossack units and the rebellious peasantry were repulsed by two private Sapieha strongholds: Stary Bychów and Szkłów in the area, operated by the Chamberlain's of Wilno Hilary Czyż and the castellan of Nowogródek Samuel Stetkiewicz12.
The military situation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania even in November 1648 was not good, and the Lithuanian Field Hetman, who demanded an increase in the contingent of the army, was perfectly aware of it. Other dignitaries, including the most competent Grand Lithuanian Hetman, Janusz Kiszka, who had information about the military situation from the Lithuanian Field Notary Władysław Wołłowicz were also aware of this fact. The later informed the Hetman that Janusz Radziwiłł entrusted him with the task of guarding the Lithuanian border south of Słuck. However, he was not sure if he could manage this task with only two banners of the army. At Petrykowicze there was a slight skirmish from which the Field Notary came out victorious. According to his account, the losses on the Lithuanian side reached only a few soldiers, up to several hundred on the Cossack side, which was probably an exaggerated value. From the captured prisoners, it was learned that in the direction of the Lithuanian grouping, the enemy corps was reaching 10,000 people. Due to receiving this information, Wołłowicz withdrew in the direction of Słuck, sending at the same time a request to Janusz Kiszka for the fastest possible reserves, preferably dragoons and infantry. The commander of the fortress refused to support the Field Lithuanian Notary, probably for fear of reducing the castle's defensive abilities. This caused an appeal to Kiszka to issue a proclamation act compelling that Captain Wolf (or Wolt) could connect the infantry from Słuck with the Lithuanian units operating nearby. Apart from reinforcements, the Field Notary had two other problems. The first was that the time of service for the banners was passing, and the second -there was no powder and cannons. Because of that they could not stop the enemy13. The military operations in the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also lasted into the winter period at the turn of 1648 and 1649, although they did not bring a change in the situation. The Lithuanians managed to deflect several cities occupied by the Cossack army and the rebellious peasantry14.
At the time, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the corps of the Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Leon Sapieha were also operating in the strength of 3 thousand soldiers, but they took part most often in suppressing peasant revolts15.
As can be seen from the above general overview of the military situation of the Grand Duchy at the end of 1648, it was not tragic in any way. Armed forces focused on the southern borders of Lithuania, and the main problem was probably the troops of the rebellious peasants rather than the small Cossack forces who were not conducting essentially offensive actions. The regular troops of the Lithuanian army, as well as the private belonged to the nobleman, poviat or provincial squads, were sufficient to deal with Cossack units. Besides, Bohdan Chmielnicki himself tried to avoid an open confrontation with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and his main goal was the war with the Polish Crown. He initially limited his plans to sabotage operations aimed at preventing Lithuania from engaging in fighting in Ukraine. He also confirmed in the conviction of Lithuanian senators that every Cossack member who would dare to do some damage in Lithuania would be punished with death, which he also confirmed with a special proclamation act16.
The issue discussed at the Ukrainian-Crown border and the policies of Jan Kazimierz and Chancellor Ossoliński towards the Cossacks were different. The last of mentioned continued to conduct a conciliatory policy towards the Cossacks, despite alarming letters from the Voivode of Bracław, Adam Kisiel, in which he called the King to collect numerous branches of the army. Voivodships and poviats, instead of expanding the armed forces in March 1649, rolled their hauls. At the same time, Chmielnicki treated the commissars of the Commonwealth unceremoniously, ignoring their call for talks to Kijów, ordering them to come to Perejasław. There, in the presence of the Muscovite, Tatar and Transylvanian delegates, the maze of Hetman and banner was given to the Notary of Military of Zaporoże. Thanks to that, they wanted to obtain even the oath of Chmielnicki's fidelity to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Of course, these calculations did not bring the expected results, and only after the departure of the representatives of Moscow and Transylvania, he agreed to cease fire until May 22, 1649, establishing a temporary border on the rivers Horyń, Prypeć and Kamieniec Podolski. Chmielnicki treated the negotiations with the Commonwealth as a measure aimed at neutralizing his opponent and establishing the nobility in the conviction of the peaceful intentions of the Cossacks. In fact, he was conducting talks on military assistance from Moscow, Transylvania, and Tatar-Turkish, and obtained a positive declaration only in the last case. In mid-April, he received a king's deputy Kazimierz Śmiarowski in Czehryń with a letter from the King to the hetman of the Cossacks and colonels. Chmielnicki greeted Jan Kazimierz's envoy in drunkenness and treated him like an ordinary bishop, not a monarch. At the same time, he acknowledged that confidential letters to Cossack officers (thanks to whom Śmiarowski was to seek an unofficial agreement with the elders) as espionage and sentenced the king's deputy to death. After the news came to Warszawa, hope for any peace negotiations was lost and warfare was started, no longer waiting for the term of the truce to expire17. Cossacks at that time invaded Ostroróg, where they murdered 400 burghers and Jews, while the regional Deputy Hetman Stanisław Lanckoroński took Bar in Podole. Despite the first warfare, Jan Kazimierz and Jerzy Ossoliński were still hoping for a peaceful settlement with the Cossacks and directing them to a planned war with Turkey, which was already completely unrealistic at that time18.
The regular military operations began in May 1649, although the Cossack hetman was still waiting for the arrival of the Tatar khan Islam Gerej III at the Biała Cerkiew, which he welcomed at the crossing across the Dniepr on 24 June. At the news of the appearance of the Tatars, two Deputy Hetmans of the Crown, Andrzej Firlej and Stanisław Lanckoroński, took refuge in Zbaraż, where they stopped on June 30, breaking the royal order, which ordered in this circumstance a defense in the further east of Konstantynów. On July 7, 1649, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki came to Zbaraż who, along with his banners, entered the fortress. After two days the Tatars came, and after that they marched to Chmielnicki with Cossack troops, thus beginning the siege of Zbaraż19.
In May 1649, Jan Kazimierz demanded from Janusz Radziwił that part of the Lithuanian army would come to the monarch in Lwów, where the crown army would gather. The king intended to use this troops in the summer campaign of 1649. Janusz Radziwiłł did not agree to divide the army, claiming that it would weaken the war capabilities of the Grand Duchy. He also received the support of Lithuanian senators gathered in Wilno. In this situation, Jan Kazimierz omitted Hetman Radziwiłł and contacted with the captains and rittmeisters. Call of the King was heard by Felicjan Tyszkiewicz, who appeared in the camp under Krasnystaw. His attitude is not surprising, because he cooperated politically with Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, the leader of the court party in Lithuania and the opponent of Radziwiłł. The remaining units did not leave Lithuania, and their officers did not obey the order of the monarch and were under the command of Janusz Radziwiłł, who began military operations against the Cossacks crowned with a great victory at Łojów20.
The first news about the siege of Zbaraż reached the starost of Sokal Zygmunt Denhoff on July 12 from the mouth of the besieged, Daniel Czapliński sent to the King. In such circumstances, the monarch decided to set off from Warsaw at the head of the few guards and courtiers already on June 24 and arrived in Lublin on July 13, where he issued a third call for a mass mobilization. It is also worth noting that in the vicinity of Zbaraż, at that time, Zygmunt Denhof and Zygmunt Przyjemski's troops operated in the power of supposedly a thousand soldiers. Marek Sobieski joined them with an army of similar sizes. Samuel Korecki stood in Targowica with another 2,000 soldiers and from these two groups, the monarch sought information about the activities at Zbaraż and the strength of the enemy troops21.
Jan Kazimierz set off from Lublin on July 17 at the head of a thin army of 5,000 soldiers, mainly infantry. Two days later, the monarch arrived in the village of Raszki near Krasnystaw, where the camp was founded and waited for other reserves22. Then the army passed, on July 21, towards Krasnystaw near Stary Zamość, where another camp was established. Here, there were branches of about 600 infantry belonged to Ludwik Wejher, voivode of Pomorze, and units (Cossack banner and Hungarian infantry) commanded by Jan Sobiepan Zamoyski23. In the census drawn up in the camp near Krasnystaw, Lithuanian troops also appear, except that they were private nobleman banners. Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Leon Sapieha issued a Cossack banner in the number of 200 horses and Tatar -100 horses. 400 Kozaks from the county banner of the Brześć Voivodeship of Lithuania also arrived. Most probably also at that time, about 600 infantrymen of the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Sapieha came to the King24.
From the camp at Kranystaw, the royal army set off at Sokal, where it was ordered on July 29, 1649. There the King decided to continue his march, despite opposition from some of the senators who were advised to wait for the levy in mass (in polish: "pospolite ruszenie" -mass mobilization of nobleman). The decision to continue the march proved to be correct because it ultimately brought the royal armies together with other dispersed military units. during it to the King joined the levy in mass from Bełz which counted over the thousand noblemen and Prince Michał Jerzy Czartoryski with several hundred people25. In addition to the monarch, the troops of the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł reached the strength of 1,500 soldiers26. Most probably in his units, there was a squadron of dragoons that immediately presented themselves to the King27. Perhaps also at that time Sapieha's troops arrived in the strength of 200 dragoons and 300 Cossacks, which were included in the calculations of Kazimierz Leon Sapieha28. From Sokal, the army moved in the direction of Toporów, where it stood on August 6, 1649. There was prepared another list of military units by Jan Kazimierz Waza. In the fourth squadron there was a cornet of dragoons of the great Lithuanian Chancellor Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł under the command of Tyburca Bourliński, and in the fifth rothas there were units of the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Leon, also dragoons -two cornets, under the command of Karol Jan Beysen. The Sapieha also had five banners in the sixth squadron. In the eighth rush there were two banners and in the twenty-first two companies Felicjan Tyszkiewicz. In the thirteenth roth we can find the banner of Kazimierz Leon Sapieha walking under the command of the not-mentioned by name Białłozor, and another banner of the named magnate, but this time Tatar was in the eighteenth rifles, under the command of Uhlan not mentioned by name. In the twentieth rothas, there were banners, although no number was mentioned, sent by the Voivode of Nowogródek Jerzy Chreptowicz29.
In addition to the camp of Jan Kazimierz, Samuel Karol Korecki arrived with 800 soldiers and seven cannons (unfortunately, we do not know what caliber), Castellan of Sandomierz Stanisław Witowski with a unit of 300 soldiers and starosta stobnicki Krzysztof Baldwin Ossoliński with 100 horseback riding formation30.
Also, the Lithuanian Equerry Bogusław Radziwiłł was to draw a certain number of soldiers and to come with them, to one of the concentration places of the army or to Zborów. Already from the winter of 1649, Radziwiłł, who held the office of a general of the royal guard, enjoyed great favors of Jan Kazimierz and belonged to the circle of close associates of the monarch31. Already in 1648, he enlisted the Hussar and Cossack banners and the regiment's of rajtars, for which he received 64,600 zlotys from the treasury. These troops were to participate in the expedition of the Lithuanian army against the Cossacks, but they did not reach the Łojów and therefore did not take part in the campaign in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at all. One can also have serious doubts as to whether the troops in question really existed because no performances were reported to the Lithuanian units, although the rioters most likely presented themselves in the displays of the royal guard or the crown army. Consequently, the Grand Lithuanian Treasurer Gedeon Michał Tryzna at the Sejm in 1650 demanded the return of the sums collected by Bogusław Radziwiłł, but the appointed tax and military commission freed the prince from charges related to the embezzlement of financial resources intended for the army. On May 15, 1649, Jan Kazimierz instructed Bogusław to take 600 German infantrymen who had been recruited in Podlasie, and Jan Berka and Captain Paweł Gulden were responsible for this. Rajtaria however was recruited by the General of the Royal Guard in the Malbork economy, and the monarch issued a special proclamation act to the administrators, in which he recommended all assistance to the prince in order to eatables and pay soldiers. As a result of a prolonged recruitment action, which was still carried out in the first decade of August 1649 in Belarus, these regiments did not appear at Zborów and were only brought to Sokal, Bogusław Radziwiłł learned about the congregation in Brześć Litewski. The Lithuanian Equerry regiments were partially disbanded, and the rest of the soldiers were sent to Podole to Bar32.
From Toporów, the royal army moved towards Biały Kamień, and not through Brody straight to Zbaraż. Perhaps the King, realistically assessing his strength, counted on the arrival of the next reserves. Under the Biały Kamień army stopped for four days due to heavy rainfall. In addition, the camp was spread over muddy terrain and at the time of marching the infantry got bogged down to the knee. Then the army moved to Złoczów, south of Lwów. During this march, there was the first battle with the Tartars, who were carrying out activities aimed at conquering the Sasów castle at Złoczów. This soldiers were defeated by the Crown troops, and with this, they managed to get a prisoner who advised the negotiations with the Khan and misled the Polish commanders with information that Chmielnicki and the Tatars were going to go against the royal army. After this event, the soldiers of the King moved directly to Zbaraż and on the evening of 13 August, reached the village of Młynowce near the town of Zborów. Due to recent heavy rains, the nearby Strypa river flooded, which caused the army to stop for two days. At that time, the general of the crown artillery, Nauk in Cracow, ms. 2253, Vol. 3: 193-193v Krzysztof Arciszewski, started to build two bridges and repair the causeway. In addition, a scout was sent to the other side of the river, which did not encounter the enemy's army33.
Meanwhile, Chmielnicki left the camp near Zbaraż mainly with the Cossack black crowd and along with the Tatars moved towards Dąbrowa located on the other side of Strypa. Without information about the enemy, Jan Kazimierz ordered the crossing of the river on August 15 on the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The place for this was chosen extremely unfortunately, which was mentioned in the letter from not mentioned by name Miaskowski (probably Wojciech, the royal secretary) to Karol Ferdynand34. The preparation of the army's passage alone left much to be desired because only three places could be repaired through which soldiers could move. In addition, the road itself caused a lot of trouble for the marching troops due to its mountainous nature and softness of the ground as a result of previous heavy rainfall. The movement was also probably hampered by the fog, which additionally had to be depressing on the soldiers. At dawn, the front guard of the royal army and the troops of Samuel Karol Korecki moved followed by artillery and infantry together with the royal regiment and Jan Kazimierz himself35. The departed troops along with the monarch who went to the church in Złoczów began building a new camp. On the opposite side of the river there were the remaining units of the rear guard, a large part of the wagons and the common offensive of Przemyśl and Lwów, and perhaps also Sanok, which arrived late in the evening and therefore did not spread out in the camp, but near it36. Around noon, came Tatars, crossing another place through Stryj, and they began offensive actions aimed at breaking up the rear guard of the royal army. The camps and the promise of rich spoils did not escape them either. In the confusion, the cars probably blocked the crossing and the battle took place in two places -in the original one and the one founded by some of the units after the crossing, the new camp37.
At the news of the skirmish of the rear guard, the monarch sent the fighting troops of the Lithuanian ViceChancellor, Kazimierz Leon Sapieha along with their banners, which were undertaking the crossing and units of the starost of Stopnica, Krzysztof Baldwin Ossoliński, and Stanislaw Witowski, castellan of Sandomierz. The first battle with the Tartars in the old camp came with the banners of Dominik Zasławski led by Krzysztof Korycki, who in vain sent messengers to the camp, which was occupied at that time with preparations for dinner, with a request for support38. Only the abovementioned crown troops, including seven banners of the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor, started to help him. In this skirmish also 300 dragoons from the banner of Karol Franciszek Korniakt, who, however, had a supply of gunpowder that would allow only putting three salvos, as well as the dragoons of the governor of Kraków, Jerzy Lubomirski39.
As the first of the reinforcing units on the Tatars, Kazimierz Leon Sapieha struck along with his seven banners, assisted by troops Felicjan Tyszkiewicz, who was killed during this, most likely several hours long clash. The squadrons of the Sandomierz castellan Witowski and Krzysztof Baldwin Ossoliński (he also died during the battle) were also destroyed. A similar fate was also met by the Lwów and Przemyśl levy in mass, which suffered serious personal losses. Most of the soldiers also lost the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Sapieha and the castellan of Sandomierz Witkowski. The Tartars after the capture of the second crossing were basically engaged in plundering the wagons in the rolling stock, and only the fire of the German infantry caused their withdrawal40.
Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Kazimierz Leon Sapieha barely escaped the battle with the Tatars. He most likely fought with his squadrons until the horse, most likely covered with white patches, was killed under him. His trusty servants Jan Stanisław Kurcz and Stefan Kazimierz Kurcz brought him out of the confusion. The Vice-Chancellors also suffered considerable material losses, losing almost all wagons along with part of the Lithuanian Metric, which was in loose sheets and after the battle were found in the form of loose cards in the mud surrounding the place of the clash41.
The next encounter with the Tatar army took place on the other side of Styr, near the new royal army camp, which was much more successful than the skirmish with units that did not manage to cross. Immediately after the river crossing, Jan Kazimierz ordered the army to erect earth embankments around the new position. However, the enemy did not immediately take action aimed at neutralizing the royal army, waiting instead for the arrival of reinforcements, and then proceeding to attack the right flank, which was commanded by the Voivode of Podole, Stanisław Rewera Potocki and the Grand Chancellor of the Crown Jerzy Ossoliński. On the left wing, banners headed by Jerzy Lubomirski and Jan Sobieski lined up, including the remaining Sapiehas who avoided breaking up in the clash with the Tatars, and the center was taken by the infantry and artillery of Major General Krzysztof Houwaldt. In the middle, there were also hussars in the number of 500 soldiers who served as the guard of the monarch's adjutant, followed by the royal guard commanded by Fromhold Wolff, Mikołaj Konstanty Giza and not mentioned by the name Wiewerski. The attack on the left wing was a favorite Tatar maneuver, known to the Polish army, allowing firing from the center's arches and the right wing of the royal army. The clash, despite the fact that the Polish troops withdrew several times and threw out the reserves, even those protecting the King, ended with the relative success of the royal army, which, however, suffered considerable losses. Part of the situation was saved by the shelling of Tatar troops with muskets and artillery concentrated in the center, and a favorable wind, which slowed down shots and leveled their effectiveness. At night, the camp was fortified and the work was personally supervised by Jan Kazimierz who, after the review, lay cross all night in front of the picture of Holy Mother in his tent. The next day, the main Cossack forces arrived and the assault on the camp began, which was repulsed by shelling with muskets and cannons supported by cavalry charges. Also, Jan Kazimierz personally encouraged soldiers to fight by returning the retreating banners. In spite of this, the situation of the royal army was extremely difficult, because it was in danger of circling and repeating the Zbaraż siege. The following day, the Cossack-Tatar forces surrounded Zborów and joined the siege of the city interrupted by constant assaults. Jan Kazimierz, having no other means to help the besieged, sent them to the camp servant and the royal cooks. They were assisted by a squad of 200 dragoons, who, in the last resort, managed to oust the enemy troops from the suburban ramparts. The Grand Chancellor of the Polish Crown, Jerzy Ossoliński, turned the fortunes of the Polish army by sending a letter to the Khan with a proposal for negotiations, thereby fulfilling the provisions of the monarch's night council with the senators present about the camp42.
From 15 to 17 August, there was an exchange of correspondence between Jan Kazimierz, Khan and Chmielnicki, and the final negotiations took place on the 18th of the same month. An important element influencing the talks was the information about the partition of the Cossack corps by the Lithuanian army commanded by Janusz Radziwiłł near Łojów. This resulted in the lack of possibility to dispose of military reserves by the Cossack commander, with the likelihood of enlarging the crown army, of which Chmielnicki probably knew perfectly well43. Kazimierz Leon Sapieha also took part in the negotiations, who after signing the settlement in the name of the King, reminded Chmielnicki that the monarch had forgiven him and showed his mercy, thereby urging him to faithful service to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth44.
The pact was signed on August 18, 1649, for acceptance by Chmielnicki, who in the course of the talks was essentially the role of extra, forced into this role by the Tatar Khan. They decided on the eternal friendship and alliance between Jan Kazimierz and the Girej House, and the payment of customary gifts for the Tartars, who additionally obtained a silent agreement on choosing a way back with the Jasyr, although numerously modest. In addition, the Khan became the guardian of the Cossacks and the guarantor of their former freedoms. The second part of the treaty included the Khan's obligations to the King of the Commonwealth, although this decision was made conditional on keeping the conditions associated with leaving the Hetman's dignity as Chmielnicki and keeping a 40,000 strong Cossack army. The next part of the treaty covered the obligations of the Republic towards the Cossacks, the most important of which was to preserve them with former liberties and set up a military register for 40,000 men, for which a specific territory was designated. Hetman of Zaporoże was additionally granted the eldership, and the Crown army and Jews were forbidden to enter the cities in which the Cossack officials would administer with their administrative power. Finally, the metropolitan was granted a place in the Senate and the offices in the following provinces: Kijów, Bracław and the Czernihów for the people of the Greek religion were guaranteed45.
Despite the fact that the war with Cossacks led by the Polish-Lithuanian state from 1648 was part of the interest of diplomats and residents of European rulers, the same battle no longer had such international overtones. Of course, not only for religious reasons, the Holy See was interested in the conflict, and it received detailed information on this subject from its nuncio in the Commonwealth, Giovanni de Torres. He also informed the headquarters about the battle of Zborów, although he was more interested in the settlement concluded in August 1649, especially on religious matters. The Pope's representative did not hide indignation from the decision giving the place in the Senate to the metropolitan and two Orthodox bishops. Torres also believed that the devotion of two provinces and the county to the followers of the Eastern rite would lead directly to the liquidation of the union in Brześć in these territories. At the end of the report, he began to take all measures to prevent the ratification of the Zborów resolutions by the Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth46.
The British diplomacy was not interested in the Battle of Zborów, and in the reports of the representatives of London, there is a noticeable break in reports from the Commonwealth from 1645 to 165047. This is obviously not a complete lack of interest in the Polish-Lithuanian state, but its own problems related to the civil war and the period of the revolution. After the decommissioning of King Charles I in 1649, Jan Kazimierz Waza issued a manifesto condemning the crime, and Charles II, the pretender to the English throne, sent his envoy John Cochrane to Warszawa, who officially informed the Polish King of the murder of his father. At the end of 1649, another envoy of Charles II, William Crofts, arrived in Warsaw, who during an audience with the Polish monarch asked for financial support for the English Royal Affairs. Jan Kazimierz, despite the fact that the Commonwealth was itself in a state of civil war, which of course involved not only military activities but also expenses necessary for this purpose, gave support to followers of the monarchy in the British Isles. In addition, they appealed to the English and Scots living in a Polish-Lithuanian state to set up a special fund aimed at collecting funds for royalists. Eventually, the constitution of 1650 imposed on the English-speaking residents and Scotsmen an obligation to pay the equivalent of 10% of the property for the purposes of Stuarts48. As you can see from the above, it was difficult in such a situation to require representatives of London, whether official or not, to be interested in the Cossack war in the Commonwealth.
The emissaries of Paris approached this issue somewhat differently and were interested not only in armed activities in Ukraine, though they treated them mostly in a general way, but also in terms of peaceful arrangements between King Jan Kazimierz, Bohdan Chmielnicki and the Tatar Khan. This is proved by their translation and recording by diplomats Jules Mazarin, thanks to which Paris could have documents regarding the conditions of peace signed with Islam III Girej near Zborów in 164949. In spite of this, unfortunately, it is in vain to look at the French accounts for the battle that interests me. The only manuscript in which you can find information on this subject is the letter of Ambassador Louis d'Arpajon to Cardinal Mazarin on August 29, 1649. The diplomat mentioned in his correspondence only one sentence about peace with the Cossacks but in a completely different context than the result of military operations50.
Summing up the Zborów expedition and the arrangement, one should agree with the statement of Tadeusz Wasilewski that despite the efforts of Jerzy Ossoliński, its results caused great dissatisfaction among the nobility, bordering on accusations of treason. The supporters of the court, in particular Ossoliński, were accused of causing some of the troops to be rolled up shortly before the expedition, the involuntary start of the mass mobilization of nobility in a timely manner, and the monarch's immediate danger being exposed. The nobles manifested their dissatisfaction with the course of events in the pages of various political pamphlets directed primarily against the organizers of the expedition. On the other hand, the letters commissioned by the royal court justified the conduct of the monarch by showing his incredible courage and dedication51.
The functioning of such considerable forces of several Lithuanian magnates in the Crown army taking part in the Zborów campaign resulted mainly from their functioning in the Lithuanian royal party. The army of the Grand Duchy consisted of a total of about 3,500 soldiers, which was a significant force 52. Lithuanian noblemen who helped Poles in Ukraine were in opposition to Janusz Radziwiłł and did not intend to cooperate with him even in military matters. Lithuanian troops during the march to Zborów were the rear guard of the crown army and therefore, after the Tartar attack, the units of Kazimierz Leon Sapieha suffered big losses, but thanks to this the rest of the army could cross the Strypa river. During the warfare, they were on the right wing of the army of King Jan Kazimierz and played an important role in the battle. These troops did not enter into the composition of the Lithuanian army under the command of Janusz Radziwiłł, oppositionist of the King Jan Kazimierz and his internal policy, also in relation to the rebellious Cossacks. However, this does not exclude the operation of private troops of the Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where a unit of Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, 300 soldiers, took part in the battles with rebellious peasants and individual Cossack troops. We should also remember about the crew of private nobleman strongholds such as Lachowicze or Stary Bychów, where Kazimierz Leon also kept the crews there at his own expense. Most of the Sapieha troops operated in the Crown Army, which was due to the fact that he was at the time the most serious and, in principle, certain candidate for the office of Grand Lithuanian Hetman. These efforts of Kazimierz Leon obliged him to participate in military expeditions alongside the monarch. In addition, participation in the war with the King was a prestigious and ambition element, which in consequence could bring specific benefits in the form of land assignments or offices, if not for a direct participant of the expedition, at least for members of his party, which would consequently significantly strengthen the leading position of specific groups53.
